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1. Introduction 
 
In England, the de-regulation of fees and student numbers has meant a growth in cohort 
sizes for subjects such as economics, with cohort sizes of 600 not uncommon.  These 
large cohorts bring many opportunities for pedagogical innovation, but also bring in 
significant costs.  Students, on arrival at University, are often very happy to send 
questions to their lecturers via e-mail, often leading to the same (or at least similar) 
questions being sent, and replied to, multiple times, in large courses incurring 
significant time costs to the instructor. 
Questions asked during lectures, and other forms of face-to-face teaching create the 
potential for positive externalities, in that in providing an answer for one student’s 
question, the instructor can also provide more clarity of understanding for other students 
within the room.  However, anecdotally, questions during face-to-face teaching can 
cause negative externalities, in that spending time answering many questions can lead 
to instructors not having the time to cover content which much of the class would find 
useful.  As such, instructors often encourage students to ask the question via e-mail, or 
during office hours. 
Whilst the receipt of e-mails provides a signal to the instructor about areas, and topics, 
which students have not understood well, the positive externalities of further clarity for 
other students is lost.  Further, if several students have the same question, it can be very 
time consuming to reply to them all.  As such, it is possible to appeal to technology to 
try to maintain the positive spillover effects of answering questions to groups of 
students, whilst also providing the opportunity for students to engage in peer 
instruction, and to further debate the topics, online, between themselves. 
  
One such technology is asynchronous message board technology.  Whilst asynchronous 
online message boards are not a new technology, to the author’s knowledge, there is 
little experimental data about the efficacy and impact of online message boards as a 
supplement to traditional person-to-person teaching.  One notable exception is Althaus 
(1997), which suggested that students who actively engaged in online discussions 
boosted their grades and their perceived engagement with the unit.  However, the results 
may well suffer from bias, as the authors found significant difference between 
participants and non-participants along the dimensions of their experience of e-mail, 
which could be correlated with their ability.  The increased perception of learning is 
further emphasised by Wu and Hiltz (2004) 
Much of the literature of online bulletin boards relates to a supplement to online 
delivered courses, and how an instructor might interact with students.  Mazzolini and 
Maddison (2003) identify three separate forms of instructor-student interaction; the 
“sage on the stage”, “guide on the side”, or the “ghost in the wings”.   Their results 
suggest that students perceive instructors who post regularly to possess expertise and 
show enthusiasm, but, the more regular posting may have a negative impact on 
discussion length.  However, Mazzolini and Maddison (2007) further note that 
discussion length in itself is not necessarily a good guide to the health of a discussion; 
an instructor answer might prevent fruitless searching by students through discussion 
to a correct answer. 
Maor (2003) further suggests that whilst online and peer learning environments might 
create the environment to enable collaborative learning, it is important for instructors 
provide a framework to enable students to participate in online discussions.  Whilst 
there have been a number of papers examining the role of asynchronous online 
  
discussions, to the author’s knowledge, none of the papers have produced convincing, 
unbiased, estimates of the impact of the message boards on individual examination 
outcomes. 
In this paper, I examine the impact of the introduction of a message board to a first-year 
mathematics and statistics unit within Economics related programmes at a UK 
university.  Within the unit, mathematics and statistics are led by two different members 
of academic staff, who used two different models of management of the online message 
boards were used; for statistics, the unit lead endeavoured to answer all questions that 
were asked by students, whilst for mathematics, staff did not answer any questions, but 
students were encouraged to ask questions.  Students also self-select into types of 
message board users; non-users, passive users and active users.  The results suggest that 
active users perform, at worst, on a level with their non-user peers, but passive users 
perform strictly worse than their active user peers.  The results differ according to 
subject and online tutor style. 
 
  
2. Background and methodology 
 
In this study, I examine the introduction of a message board into a core, first year 
Mathematics and Statistics unit for 286 Economics students within a UK, Russell 
Group1 University. 
At the subject University, all students in BSc Economics (and equivalent) programmes 
must study four, core, units in their first year; Mathematics and Statistical Methods 1 
(MSM1), Mathematics and Statistical Methods 2 (MSM2), Economic Principles 1 
(EP1) and Economic Principles 2 (EP2).  In addition to these, students also register for 
two, additional, units.  The teaching and assessment for these units is split by semester, 
with MSM1 and EP1 taught in semester 1, and MSM2 and EP2 taught in semester 2.  
Each of these units are assessed through 100% examination.  The overall structure of 
the first year is illustrated in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Both MSM1 and MSM2 consist of 50% mathematics, and 50% statistics; the statistical 
focus in MSM2 is on introductory econometrics.  The mathematics and statistics core 
material is delivered by separate lecturers, but the lecturer for statistics remains constant 
across the academic year.  The assessment for both of these units consists of a 3 hour 
examination; in both cases, section A of the examination consists of 50 marks worth of 
mathematics, and section B consists of 50 marks worth of statistics. 
In semester 2, it was decided to introduce message board software to the Mathematics 
and Statistics 2 unit (only) to enable positive externalities for students from being able 
                                                 
1 The Russell Group is a group of 24 research intensive, traditional Universities.  More information is 
available from  http://russellgroup.ac.uk/ 
  
to observe other students’ questions (and answers) to problems, and to encourage peer 
to peer learning.  In the first semester, no message board technology was available, but 
students could ask questions of their lecturers via e-mail, or in office hours. 
The Piazza message board allows students to ask questions and collaborate.  As 
discussed in Kang et al (2013), anonymity is likely to reduce inhibition, but runs the 
risk that participants may take advantage of anonymity.  Hence, to try and maximise 
participation, students were allowed to post anonymously to the message board, but 
with the knowledge that the message board was being monitored by academics, and 
was reactively moderated.  The anonymity worked by not allowing other students to 
view who had posted the messages, but system administrators were able to view who 
had been submitting messages (although the administrators could not always link up 
which message was sent by which student) 
The choice of the Piazza message board was also motivated by the fact that equations 
could be included using a simple LaTeX equation editor, which enabled students to ask 
questions, and to view answers with more precision than was possible with simple, text-
based e-mails or message boards.   
Prior to the start of semester two, Piazza message boards were set up, with separate 
areas for mathematics and statistical questions.  For the statistical side of the unit, 
students were instructed that they should not send questions via e-mail, and should only 
ask questions via the Piazza message boards, and that questions via e-mail would not 
be answered; as such, the message boards were intended as a substitute for e-mail 
communications.  The statistics lecturer provided full answers to any questions students 
asked on the message boards. 
  
For the mathematical side of the unit, students were allowed to ask questions on the 
message boards, but the unit lecturer continued to answer questions via e-mail, and no 
answers were provided from academic staff to mathematics questions on the message 
boards.   
No other changes were made to the resources available in semester 2; in both semesters, 
academic staff provided drop-in office hours; the main delivery method of teaching was 
a traditional method of lectures supported by small group classes. 
Following the structure set out in Mazzolini and Maddison (2003), there are effectively 
two strategies employed here; in statistics, the lecturer took a “sage on the stage” role, 
by directly answering all questions, whilst for mathematics, the lecturer adopted a 
“ghost in the wings” role, by allowing students ask and answer all questions. 
Whilst the message board software was made available to all students, students had to 
opt in to the software by voluntarily setting up an account and signing in.  The message 
board software was repeatedly advertised via e-mail, in lectures, and on the Online 
Learning Environment (Blackboard).  Despite the fact that the software was made 
available to all students, only 50% of students registered on the unit signed up for the 
message board. 
As such, this is a pseudo-natural experiment.  In semester 1, all students are untreated 
in mathematics and statistics.  In semester two, students who signed up for the message 
board software receive the treatment of the message board, and those who do not sign 
up are the untreated.  However, since sign up is non-random, it is important to explore 
whether this affects the causality of the results; I discuss how I control for this non-
randomness in section 5. 
  
The treatment effect is also different for mathematics and statistics.  In statistics, the 
message board software was fully supported by the unit lecturer, with all answers posed 
by students given full, explanatory, answers; students also understood that no answers 
would be given to questions via e-mail.  For mathematics, students could pose 
questions, but these questions were only answered by peers; staff continued to answer 
e-mails (as they had in the first semester).  As such, it is possible to observe two 
different treatment effects. 
3. Data 
The data was collected from students who were registered on the first year of degree 
programmes in economics (and related subjects) at a UK Russell Group university in 
2015/16.  All of the students in the study studied two mathematics and statistical 
methods units, and two economic principles units.  (Mathematics and Statistical 
Methods 1, Mathematics and Statistical Methods 2, Economic Principles 1, Economic 
Principles 2). 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for these examinations (and sub-parts of 
examinations).  The data is restricted to students on programmes with Mathematics and 
Statistical methods 2 as a core, compulsory unit.  For these programmes, it is also 
compulsory for students to study Mathematics and Statistical methods 1, Economic 
Principles 1, and Economic Principles 2.  However, there are a number of students who 
do not complete all of the units, either as they are repeating years to pick up credit 
points for failed units, or due to illness, they miss one or more of the examinations, who 
are omitted from the dataset.  Further, any students who reported experiencing 
extenuating circumstances, which may have affected their performance in any of their 
examinations are omitted from the data.  This leaves 253 students in the dataset. 
  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
Since students are not randomly assigned to the treatment of message boards, as they 
choose to sign up (or not), there will be unobserved heterogeneity between individuals 
who are treated and untreated in this model.  Individuals’ (unobserved) characteristics, 
X, are thus likely to determine whether they receive the treatment, or not 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖)                                (1) 
Students outcomes at time t are determined by their individual characteristics, along 
with educational inputs.  However, individuals’ educational outcomes (𝑌𝑖𝑡) at time t are 
also likely to be a function of (unobserved) individual characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑡), along with 
teaching (𝑇𝑖𝑡) and effort (𝐸𝑖𝑡) input. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑋𝑖, 𝑇𝑖𝑡, 𝐸𝑖𝑡)                                   (2) 
It is conceivable that the unobserved characteristics that determine the likelihood to 
sign up for the treatment are the same as the unobserved characteristics which determine 
outcomes; for instance, a student who is a very hard worker may be expected to gain 
good grades in their exams, but may also want to take advantage of all opportunities to 
ask questions of instructors.  As such, this individual would be more likely to sign up 
to the message board system. 
A naïve OLS estimate of the impact of exam scores against whether a student has signed 
up for a message board would, thus, suffer from omitted variables bias.   
  
However, the students are observed in two time periods; during both time periods, they 
study cognate subjects; in both time periods, they study mathematics, statistics, and 
economics.  In period 1, no individuals receive the treatment of message board 
software, whilst in period 2, only a subset of students receive the treatment.  As such, 
it is possible to eliminate the impact of the unobserved heterogeneity by considering 
first differences, and compare the change in test scores between the treated and the 
untreated groups.  However, this difference-in-difference specification will only be 
valid if the unobserved heterogeneity only affects the level of the exam score, and not 
the progression rate of the students. 
Provided the trends between the treated and the untreated groups are the same, it will 
be possible to thus assess the efficacy of message board software, and different 
strategies using a difference in difference specification, as discussed in Card and 
Krueger (1994) and Meyer (1995) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡             (3) 
Treat is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an individual, i, signs up to the 
message boards in semester 2, semester is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in 
semester 2, and u is assumed to be a random error term.  As such, 𝛽3 is our causal 
treatment term; this represents how much more (or less) students who sign up for the 
message boards improve compared with their peers who did not sign up. 
The difference in difference methodology will provide a causal estimate of the impact 
of online message boards on examination outcomes, provided that the pre-treatment 
trend is the same for both treated and untreated groups.  In the case of random allocation 
to treatment, this would not create a problem.  However, in this experimental design, 
  
students opt in to the treatment, and so care needs to be taken in ensuring that 
unobserved heterogeneity is not a cause of bias in the estimates.   
There are two potential threats to the internal validity of this analysis; firstly students 
who sign up for the message boards have different rates of progress ex-ante than those 
who do not sign up for the message boards.  Secondly, students who sign up for the 
message-boards may have changed their study habits between semester 1 and semester 
2.  In either case, if significant results are simply the result of bias, the same results 
would be observed in the Economic Principles unit as observed in the mathematics and 
statistical methods units.   
To test whether omitting ethos causes bias to the estimates of the impact of message 
boards on exam scores, I consider a further specification; I re-estimate equation (3) 
using the scores from economic principles (where no such treatment was included) as 
the dependent variable, and the treatment variables left unchanged.  If the ethos of 
students is a causal factor in signing up for the online message boards and a determinant 
of the progression of students (and not just the level) of students, then one would expect 
any results for the impact of message board software to be replicated in both 
mathematics and statistical methods and economic principles.  However, if zero impact 
is seen in the specification using economic principles, then it could be concluded that 
there is likely little problem with not observing the student ethos, or equivalent 
variables. 
Table 3 shows the performance of students in their semester 1 units, broken down by 
whether they have signed up for the message boards or not.  As shown in Table 3, there 
is no difference in mathematical attainment prior to the treatment being introduced 
between the treated and untreated group (p=0.7481).  However, students who sign up 
  
for the treatment of message boards have a statistically significantly higher grade in 
statistics (p=0.0006) in the untreated examination (MSM1). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The marks that students can achieve in the mathematics and statistics examinations are 
censored above (at 50) and below (at 0); as such, a student who gained a relatively low 
mark in the first teaching block has limited scope for a reduction in grade in the second 
teaching block, but a significant scope for an increase in grade.  Similarly, students who 
gain a high mark in the first teaching block have much more scope for reducing their 
mark than increasing.   
As seen in Table 3 , the students who sign up for message boards are significantly higher 
performers in statistics than those who do not sign up.  As such, due to the limited 
opportunities to improve their scores, in the absence of any causal effect from message 
boards, a negative impact would be predicted. 
As a robustness check, in order to control for this possibility, I consider a refinement to 
the difference in difference strategy, by only considering a subset of students, with 
matched attainment in the untreated teaching block 1.  To create the subset for 
mathematics (statistics), the students with the lowest 10% of mathematics (statistics) 
marks are dropped from the sample.  Table 4 shows the distribution of test scores for 
students in the middle 80% of the distribution, again broken down by piazza usage.  By 
omitting the lowest and highest 10% of students, the performances in mathematics 
(P=0.7168) and statistics (P=0.1662 are not statistically significantly different from 
each other.  By omitting the highest and lowest performers, it should be possible to 
  
avoid bias caused by the censoring of the data, and will reduce any selection bias by 
matching students on prior attainment. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
As a further test of robustness, and to take account of possible problems due to the 
censoring of data, a second specification can be considered; using a Tobit regression.  
In UK University examinations, students are rarely awarded marks of either close to 
zero, or close to full marks; as such, it is likely that marks are partially censored above 
and below.  The mathematics and statistics sections of the examinations are marked out 
of 50 marks each, whilst the Economic Principles examinations are marked out of 100.  
As such, I consider the possibility that in the mathematics and statistics sections 
students who gained less than 10 (out of 50) and more than 40 (out of 50) had their 
marks artificially censored, and they should have received lower (or higher) marks, if 
there had been no external constraint.  Similarly, for the Economic Principles 
examination, I treat the marks as artificially censored if the marks are lower than 20, or 
higher than 80.  The range of possible censoring creates a relatively conservative 
estimate of where marks may have been censored, so should provide a good robustness 
check for the original results. 
A second, potential, issue relating to trend assumption is that the ethos of students may 
be correlated with their likelihood to sign up for the message board software.  For 
example, it may be the case that students who are hard-working are more likely to sign 
up for the message board software, and these students are also more likely to make 
better progress than lower-effort peers.  Contemporaneously to their MSM1 and MSM2 
units, students are also studying Economic Principles 1 and Economic Principles 2, 
which were not provided with similar opt-in message boards.  If there is a difference in 
  
motivation for students who opt in to the message boards, the same results would be 
expected for changes in Economic Principles marks as seen in Mathematics and 
Statistical Methods.  If the estimated impact for economic principles is equal to zero, 
then this suggests that there is little problem due to the self-selection of students. 
 
 
 
  
5. Student usage of Piazza 
In order for online resources to be most efficacious, students need to be engaged and 
participatory; for example, Beaudoin (2002) identifies that whilst students who are 
appear inactive learners in online education courses believe that they are engaged in 
productive learning activities, their mean grades are lower than their more visibly active 
peers.  Figure 1 shows a time series indicating the number of students who access Piazza 
per day; teaching began at the end of January, and between February and May, 
approximately 20 students were accessing per day.  Prior to the exam period (the final 
week of May and first week of June), the number of students accessing Piazza 
increased.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Table 5 shows summary statistics for student engagement with the Piazza message 
board.  In total, 141 students signed up for the Piazza service (from 284 total students 
registered for the unit).  Whilst there were 141 students enrolled, only 45 posed 
questions, and 19 offered answers.  The average student who was registered viewed 51 
questions (interquartile range 9-92, median 27).   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
However, the students can be split into active and passive users; only 31.9% of students 
who registered for Piazza use asked questions, whilst only 13.5% answered questions.  
Table 5 shows the mean engagement by students, splitting them into active students who 
either asked or answered questions, and passive students who did not provides more 
insight into student engagement.  In the active group, students viewed an average of 
  
80.85 questions, compared with 36.45 for inactive students.  On average, active students 
asked 3.2 questions and answered 1.87. 
There were differences in engagement between mathematics and statistics.  In statistics, 
136 student questions were asked, whilst for mathematics only 21 questions asked.  This 
difference is partly explained by the engagement of staff; students knew that the unit 
lecturer was willing to answer questions for statistics, but for the mathematics section 
(lectured by a different instructor) no such support was offered.   
157 questions in total were asked during the teaching, 21 for mathematics and 136 for 
statistics.  Of all the answers provided, 67% were provided by the statistics lecturer; all 
of the mathematics questions, however, were answered by active students.   
  
6. Results 
 Table 6 shows the OLS results of the difference in difference specification, as shown in 
equation (3) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡             (3) 
Since individuals are observed twice in the data, and I can only control for a limited 
amount of heterogeneity, it is likely that there is significant residual correlation.  To 
mitigate against this, I use standard errors, clustered at the student level. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The coefficient, represented by treatment on the treated in Table 6 shows the difference-
in-difference estimate.  Beginning with the economic principles estimates; this result 
provides a test of the common trend assumption.   If there are differences in progress, 
either due to prior differences, or differences in student study pattern which are 
correlated with student sign-up for the message boards, then the results for the treated 
subjects would be expected to be matched by those in the untreated subject.  The 
estimates effect, whilst small and positive is not statistically significant at any 
reasonable level of significance (p=0.906).  This suggests that the expected level of 
progress for students who sign-up for the message boards is zero, absent of the message 
board technology; any significant results found for mathematics and/or statistics can 
thus be seen as causal. 
Moving onto the treated subjects.  Beginning with the mathematics part of mathematics 
and statistical methods, as discussed earlier, students who sign up for the message board 
software are not significantly different in scores from those who do not, in semester 1.  
However, the causal estimate suggests that those who sign up for the message boards 
  
increase their mathematics score by 2.965 points (or 0.36 standard deviations) 
compared with those who do not sign up. 
Conversely, in statistics, Table 6 shows that those who sign up for message boards 
perform 2.437 marks (or 0.26 standard deviations) worse than those who did not.  It 
should be noted that this result is significant at the 10% significance level (p=0.066).  
However, this result is somewhat counterintuitive, as it suggests that using the message 
board software, when provided with academic support leads to worse grades than either 
no message board software (control), or message board software with no support 
(mathematics). 
Column 3 of Table 6 provides us with a test of the common trend assumption; The second 
form of bias that we may be worried about is the possibility that due to censoring of 
exam marks (to a maximum of 50 and a minimum of 0) for each section.  Table 7 shows 
the results from the specification, omitting the highest and lowest performers.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
For mathematics, the results are largely unchanged, with a large, significant, positive 
effect, but for statistics, the magnitude of the negative result is reduced, and becomes 
insignificant.    
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
As a further test of robustness for these results, I consider the possibility that there is 
partial censoring for students with marks close to the maxima and minima for each 
exam (section).  To allow for this Table 8 shows the results of a Tobit analysis, with 
censoring below beginning at 10 marks and above at 40 marks for mathematics and for 
  
statistics, and for Economic Principles, censoring below beginning at 20 marks and 
above beginning at 80 marks.  (In each specification, this relates to censoring below 
20% and above 80%).  The results presented are not quantitatively different from the 
results of Table 6, suggesting that censoring of the data may not be a significant issue2. 
6.1 Active versus passive users 
As discussed above, students who sign up for the online message boards are split into 
two types; active participants who actively ask and answer questions, and passive 
participants, who only sign up to view questions; thus I can investigate the causal 
impact of different forms of engagement with online message boards.  Table 9 shows 
the results of the difference in difference specifications for two sub-samples.  
Subsample 1 uses only students who actively asked and/or answered questions on 
Piazza as the treatment group, whilst subsample 2 uses only students who signed up for 
Piazza, but did not ask or answer any questions as the treatment group.  In both cases, 
the control group consists of students who did not sign up to use Piazza. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In specification (1), the treatment group are students who actively participated in the 
Piazza message boards; the estimated impact for mathematics is 4.444 marks (or 0.54 
standard deviations).  For statistics, the impact is not significantly different from zero.  
Specification (2) uses students who passively participate in the message boards.  There 
is a smaller, positive estimated impact for mathematics (2.143 marks), but for statistics, 
there is a large, statistically significant, negative impact on the treated (3.650 marks, 
                                                 
2 The magnitude of effect is replicated if we use censoring at 30% and 70%, although the statistical 
significance disappears for the negative impact in statistics.  Table available on request. 
  
p=0.014).  Thus, in both mathematics and statistics there is a between 2 and 3 mark 
difference between the passive and active users of Piazza. 
As such, this indicates that whilst the pooled regressions, illustrated in Table 6, the 
negative results for statistics are being driven by students who sign up for message 
boards, but do not actively engage. 
7. Concluding Remarks and Discussion 
 
Beaudoin (2002) makes the observation that in online classes, whilst low visibility 
learners may be engaged in study, they perform worse in terms of exam grades than 
more visible students who engage with the online material.  In this paper, I have found 
similar, striking results. 
The mathematics results provide encouragement about the usage of online message-
boards; students who actively engaged with the message boards significantly improved 
their outcomes, compared with both students who did not engage, and students who 
signed up, but did not, actively engage with the message boards.  This distinction should 
not be surprising, as numerous studies have suggested that active learning improves 
student outcomes over and above passive learning (e.g. Dorestani (2005), Michel et al 
(2009)). 
Within the results for statistics, using the online message boards has no significant 
impact on students who actively engage with the material, although students who 
passively engage with the material perform markedly worse than students who do not 
use the system.   
Anecdotally, a secondary change also occurred with the introduction of the message 
boards; attendance at office hours was significantly reduced, which may partially 
  
explain the negative impact on inactive statistics students.  Students may be, 
inappropriately, substituting one measure of contact (office hours) for another (message 
boards).  Whilst this is not having any detrimental effect on the students who actively 
engage in the message boards, the substitution proves less than effective for the passive 
users.  Thus, in order to ensure that message boards are not detrimental, it is important 
to ensure that any substitutions of effort are productive substitutions. 
Even though the results suggest little positive impact of the message boards for 
statistics, if all students could be encouraged to be active participants in the message 
board software (and thus not suffering from the negative impact), this could still be a 
Pareto improvement.  In many courses, staff spend significant time answering student 
queries via e-mail, with often queries being repeated by multiple students; answering 
questions via a message board only requires an answer to be provided once, and would 
thus require less time to answer questions, freeing up time to produce additional 
material for students. 
The differential results for mathematics and statistics could be down to two factors; 
either students respond differently to online message boards in mathematics teaching 
compared with statistics teaching, or alternatively, the peer instruction mechanism is a 
more effective teaching mechanism than a mechanism where instructors actively 
engage.  In this paper, it is impossible to identify the mechanism, raising questions for 
further work. 
However, the observed behaviour of students does suggest that the impact of a 
completely peer led discussion board is limited; in contrast to the results of Mazzolini 
and Maddison (2003), engagement with the discussion board was much greater for 
  
statistics-related questions than for mathematics related questions, in spite of the greater 
level of tutor engagement in the statistics message boards. 
 
  
  
References 
 
1. Althaus, S. L. 1997. Computer-mediated communication in the university 
classroom: An experiment with on-line discussions, Communication Education, 
46:3, 158-174 
2. Beaudoin, M.F., 2002. Learning or Lurking? Tracking the “invisible” online 
student, Internet and Higher Education 5, 147-155 
3. Card, D. and Krueger, A.B., 1994. Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case 
Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, The American 
Economic Review, 84, 4, pp772-793 
4. Dorestani, A., 2005, “Is interactive learning superior to traditional lecturing in 
economics courses?” Humanomics, 21, 1-20 
5. Kang, R., Brown, S., and Kiesler, S., 2013. Why do people seek anonymity on 
the internet?: informing policy and design, in Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems., 2657-2666 
6. Maor, D. 2003. The teacher’s role in developing interaction and reflection in an 
online learning community, Educational media International, 40(1-2), 127-138. 
7. Mazzolini, M., and Maddison, S. 2003. Sage, guide or ghost? The effect of 
instructor intervention on student participation in online discussions forums, 
Computers and Education, 40(3), 2337-253 
8. Mazzolini, M., and Maddison, S. 2007. When to jump in: The role of the 
instructor in online discussion forums, Computers and Education, 49(2), 193-
213. 
9. Michel, N., Cater, J.J., and Varela, O., 2009, “Active Versus Passive Teaching 
Styles: An Emprical Study of Student Learning Outcomes”, Human Resource 
Development Quarterly, 20(4), 397 – 418 
10. Meyer, B.D., 1995. Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics; 13, 2 
11. Wu, D., Hiltz, S.R., 2004, Predicting learning from asynchronous online 
discussions, Journal of Asynchronous Learning Network, 9(2), 139-152 
  
  
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Structure of teaching 
Semester 1 (September – January) 
(Examinations in January) 
Semester 2 (January – May) 
(Examinations in May/June) 
Economic Principles 1 Economic Principles 2 
Mathematics and Statistical Methods 1  Mathematics and Statistical Methods 2 
Option Option 
 
  
  
 
Table 2 Summary statistics 
 MSM1 MSM2 EP1 EP2 
Mean 59.264 59.502 59.265 62.897 
Standard deviation 15.156 15.105 9.342 11.385 
Number of observations 253 253 253 253 
 
  
  
 
Table 3 Summary statistics for semester 1 units, broken down by students’ 
subscription to Piazza 
 
 Did not sign up to 
message boards 
Signed up to message 
boards 
Test of equality of 
means 
Mathematics  
Mean 30.134 30.398 𝑃 = 0.7481 
Standard Deviation 6.555 6.489 
Number of observations 127 126  
Statistics  
Mean 24.524 29.266 𝑃 = 0.0006 
Standard Deviation 11.398 10.215 
Number of observations 127 126  
Economic Principles  
Mean 57.799 60.742 𝑃 = 0.0119 
Standard Deviation 9.342 9.291 
Number of observations 127 126  
Notes: Students are omitted if they have extenuating circumstances affecting their performance in 
either TB1 or TB2 examinations, only students who are examined in both MSM1,  MSM2, and EP1 
and EP2 are considered. 
 
  
  
 
Table 4 Summary statistics for semester 1 units, broken down by students’ 
subscription to Piazza, omitting the lowest and highest performers in TB1 
examinations 
 Did not sign up to 
message boards 
Signed up to message 
boards 
Test of equality of 
means 
Mathematics  
Mean 30.390 30.183 𝑃 = 0.7168 
Standard Deviation 4.307 3.779 
Number of observations 102 101  
Statistics  
Mean 26.485 28.071 𝑃 = 0.1662 
Standard Deviation 8.635 7.739 
Number of observations 102 105  
Notes: Students are omitted if they have extenuating circumstances affecting their performance in 
either TB1 or TB2 examinations, only students who are examined in both MSM1 and MSM2 are 
considered.  The sample sizes are marginally different as the lowest and highest performers are 
determined based on marks in mathematics, and in statistics, separately. 
  
  
 
Table 5 Mean engagement, by student activity 
 
 Views Questions asked Questions 
answered 
Students who either asked or answered questions 80.85 3.21 1.87 
Students who did not ask or answer questions 36.45 0 0 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 6 OLS results for the standard difference in difference specification 
 
  Mathematics and Statistical Methods 
 Economic Principles Mathematics Statistics 
Treated 3.219*** 0.291 4.587*** 
 (1.151) (0.829) (1.374) 
Semester 3.547*** -0.382 2.378** 
 (0.992) (0.603) (0.987) 
Treatment on the treated 0.171 2.965*** -2.437* 
(1.449) (0.861) (1.318) 
R2 0.08 0.04 0.04 
Number of students 253 253 253 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the examination mark.  For Mathematics and Statistical Methods, each 
section is marked out of 50.  Students are only included if they have marks for both semesters.  For 
Economic Principles, the examination is marked out of 100.  Standard errors, clustered by student are 
reported in parentheses.  Student with extenuating circumstances are omitted from the analysis.  Students’ 
programme of study is controlled for.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
  
  
 
Table 7 Difference in difference results, omitting the highest and lowest performers. 
 
 Mathematics and Statistical Methods 
 Mathematics Statistics 
Treated -0.251 1.209 
 (0.569) (1.153) 
Semester -0.140 1.946* 
 (0.653) (0.991) 
Treatment on the treated 2.645*** -0.865 
(0.947) (1.322) 
R2 0.06 0.05 
Number of students 203 206 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the examination mark.  For Mathematics and Statistical Methods, each 
section is marked out of 50.  Students are only included if they have marks for both semesters.  Quantiles 
for mathematics(statistics) are constructed based on performance in the mathematics(statistics) section 
of the MSM1 examination.  Standard errors, clustered by student are reported in parentheses.  %.  Student 
with extenuating circumstances are omitted from the analysis.  Students’ programme of study is 
controlled for. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
 
  
  
Table 8 Robustness check using Tobit analysis 
 Economic 
Principles 
Mathematics Statistics 
Treated 3.286*** 0.217 4.617*** 
 (1.156) (0.821) (1.470) 
Semester 3.601*** -0.115 2.594** 
 (0.993) (0.597) (1.088) 
Treatment on the 
treated 
0.222 3.143*** -2.609* 
 (1.456) (0.894) (1.459) 
Number of 
students 
253 253 253 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the examination mark.  For Mathematics and Statistical Methods, each 
section is marked out of 50.  Data is treated as partially censored at marks of 10 and 40 for mathematics 
and statistical methods.  Data is treated as partially censored at marks of 20 and 80 for economic 
principles.  Students are only included if they have marks for both semesters.  For Economic Principles, 
the examination is marked out of 100.  Standard errors, clustered by student are reported in parentheses.  
Student with extenuating circumstances are omitted from the analysis.  Students’ programme of study is 
controlled for.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
 
  
  
Table 9 Comparing active and passive students. 
 Treatment group – Active students 
(1) 
Treatment group – Passive students 
(2) 
 Mathematics Statistics Mathematics Statistics 
Treated 0.187 5.214*** 0.375 4.351*** 
 (1.087) (1.650) (0.958) (1.601) 
Semester -0.382 2.378** -0.382 2.378** 
 (0.604) (0.990) (0.604) (0.989) 
Treatment on treated 4.444*** -0.256 2.143** -3.650** 
 (1.130) (1.710) (0.989) (1.476) 
R2 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 
Number of students 172 172 208 208 
Treated students 45 45 81 81 
Untreated students 127 127 127 127 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the examination mark.  For Mathematics and Statistical Methods, each 
section is marked out of 50.  Students are only included if they have marks for both semesters.  Standard 
errors, clustered by student are reported in parentheses.  Student with extenuating circumstances are 
omitted from the analysis.  Students’ programme of study is controlled for.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01   
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1 Number of users per day 
 
Notes: Figure constructed from data held by Piazza. 
